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We report on a bright, nondegenerate type-I parametric down-conversion source, which is well
suited for passive decoy-state quantum key distribution. We show the photon-number-resolved
analysis over a broad range of pump powers and we prove heralded higher-order n-photon states
up to n = 4. The inferred photon click statistics exhibit excellent agreements to the theoretical
predictions. From our measurement results we conclude that our source meets the requirements to
avert photon-number-splitting attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ar, 42.50.Dv, 42.65.Lm
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been a field of
high interest for almost three decades now, since it allows
two trustworthy parties, Alice and Bob, to communicate
with unconditional security under certain constraints.
However, realistic implementations of QKD schemes suf-
fer from security loopholes [1–7] due to technical imper-
fections. Among these loopholes, the photon-number-
splitting (PNS) attack [8] allows an eavesdropper, Eve,
to take advantage of non-ideal properties of real-world
photon sources. In particular, photon-pair sources based
on parametric down-conversion (PDC) emit signals with
higher-order photon contributions, which could be in-
tercepted and stored by Eve to gain information about
the secret key during the classical phase of a standard
prepare-and-measure protocol [9]. When Eve replaces
a lossy quantum channel with a perfect one, she could
mimic the detected click statistics of the lossy quantum
channel and cannot be detected.
In 2007 Mauerer et al. proposed the passive decoy-
state QKD protocol [10] and theoretically showed the
circumvention of photon number splitting attacks, even
in the presence of imperfect photon-pair sources based
on PDC. It was also proven that the unconditionally se-
cure transmission distance is on par with perfect single-
photon sources [10, 11]. The scheme is based on the idea
of intermittent decoy states [12, 13] within the quantum
key string in order to detect Eve’s presence. But, in con-
trast to active decoy schemes, the passive decoy approach
turns the unavoidable higher photon-number components
in a PDC into a real benefit by tagging them as intrin-
sic decoys. Importantly, this does not require the ac-
tive modulation or phase randomization of the photon
source’s emission. The passive decoy scheme offers the
distinct advantage that the PDC-based system itself does
not open any side channels with distinguishing informa-
tion for different intensities, because all required decoy
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states are post-selected after transmission. However, the
implementation of a reliable, bright, compact and effi-
cient PDC source with a well-known photon-number dis-
tribution is crucial to achieve the desired performance.
In this paper we present a robust and bright inte-
grated photon-pair source based on titanium-indiffused,
periodically poled waveguide structures in lithium nio-
bate (Ti:PPLN). It efficiently generates signal photons
at around 803 nm and idler photons around 1573 nm.
The former lend themselves to efficient photon-number-
resolved detection, whereas the latter allow for low-loss
transmission in fiber-based QKD systems. Our source
is capable of splitting the generated pairs on chip in a
spatio-spectral manner [14]. This conveniently allows Al-
ice to keep one half (signal) of the strictly correlated pairs
for thorough photon-number analysis, whereas the other
half (idler) can be transmitted to her trusted counterpart
Bob.
The key feature of our source is that it meets the
requirements for practical passive decoy-state QKD.
In particular, we measured its click statistics using
photon-number-resolving detectors and inferred the pho-
ton statistics from the measurement. We registered
higher-order PDC photon numbers reliably and demon-
strate heralded n-photon states up to n = 4, which can
be employed as post-selectable decoys in order to prevent
PNS attacks. In the following, we verify that the detec-
tion statistics of our source behaves as expected for the
different n-photon states. This will prove its applicability
as a basic building block in highly secure QKD systems
based on passive decoy-state selection.
First, we write down the probability that Bob’s binary
detector generates a click from an arbitrary m-photon
state:
p(click) = 1− (1− ηB)
m, (1)
with Bob’s overall transmission and detection efficiency
ηB = ηC · ηOC · ηDet. Herein ηC denotes the length-
dependent quantum channel efficiency, ηOC is the trans-
mission of supplementary optical components and ηDet
2labels Bob’s detector efficiency. Note that Eq. (1) im-
plies different click probabilities for different m-photon
states.
Second, we assume that Alice’s photon-number-
resolving detector yields n photon detection events from
an m-photon state with m ≥ n. Consequently, the con-
ditioned probability for a click at Bob’s detector is
p(click|n) =
p(click ∩ n)
p(n)
=
∞∑
m=n
(
m
n
)
ρmη
n
T (1− ηT)
m−n
(1− (1− ηB)
m
)
∞∑
m=n
(
m
n
)
ρmη
n
T (1− ηT)
m−n
,
(2)
where p(click ∩ n) is the cumulative joint probability of
a click event in Bob’s detector from an m-photon state,
while n out of m photons impinge on Alice’s photon-
number-resolving detector. The coefficients ρm describe
the photon-number distribution of the m-photon state,
which is Poissonian [15, 16] for the spectrally multi-mode
PDC sources like those expected in our case. The term
ηT labels the overall efficiency of the photon-number-
resolving detector and includes losses as well as the gen-
uine detection efficiency. The efficiency ηT for our case
is experimentally accessible as will be described below in
Eq. (6).
Especially, in the limit of a low efficiency, ηB ≪ 1, we
can calculate the conditioned probabilities p(click|n) for
different n-photon states from Eq. (2), and find that the
approximation
r (n) =
p (click|n)
p (click|1)
≈
n · ηB
ηB
= n, (3)
is valid. This means that the fractions of Bob’s click
probabilities conditioned on different n and the click
probability conditioned on the one-photon contribution
scale approximately linear with n. At higher efficien-
cies ηB the values of r (n) will decrease. Thus, at ele-
vated pump power levels the impact of higher-order pho-
ton contributions as well as non-ideal photon-number-
resolving detector properties must be taken into ac-
count. In order to realize photon-number resolution
with Alice’s detection apparatus, we implemented a time-
multiplexing detector [17, 18] (TMD) for signal wave-
lengths of 803 nm. The delay between individual time
bins (∼ 127 ns) is set larger than the dead time of stan-
dard silicon avalanche photodiodes used for signal photon
detection. The chosen architecture provides eight tem-
poral output modes behind the TMD (photon numbers
of n ≤ 8) without losing photons by dead-time effects.
Due to this limitation, we additionally take convolution
effects [19, 20] of higher-order photon contributions into
account for the data analysis method [21] as well as for
the theoretical predictions. A schematic of one possible
passive decoy-state QKD implementation at Alice’s side
including the TMD is shown in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. Alice’s source configuration for passive decoy-state
QKD: PDC signal photons (803 nm) are separated on chip
from idler photons (1573 nm), fed into the eight-bin time-
multiplexer, and are detected with binary detectors (Si-
APDs). The (encoded) idler photons are transmitted to Bob
via the quantum channel.
For the experimental analysis, we derive the condi-
tioned probabilities p (click|n) as the fraction of measured
click events in Bob’s detector, given that an n-photon
state is detected by Alice’s non-ideal TMD, and the to-
tal number of events:
p (click|n) =
N(click|n)
N(click|n) +N(no click|n)
. (4)
Note, that p (click|n) still has to be corrected for convo-
lution effects.
We carry out pump-power-dependent measurements
with the setup shown in Fig. 2, since the mean pho-
ton number of PDC states is related to the power of the
pump pulse. Our pump laser offers ps pulses at 532 nm,
which can be variably attenuated and coupled into our
periodically poled waveguide structure. Generated sig-
nal and idler photons are demultiplexed on chip and sep-
arated into two output beams. Behind the waveguide
chip, we clean up PDC photons from background and
residual pump light using a home-coated absorber and
narrowband dielectric filters. In the signal arm we ad-
dress the TMD and, subsequently, two free-running sili-
con avalanche photodiodes (APD), both with ηSi = 0.55
detection efficiency. The idler arm consists of a variable
attenuator, which mimics an arbitrary channel loss ηC.
Behind this device, we address a gated InGaAs-APD,
which offers 2.5 ns detection windows, a detection effi-
ciency of ηDet = 0.24 and 1µs dead time. It exhibits a
dark count probability of pdc = 1.75× 10
−4 per gate.
For the detection, all APDs are connected to a time-
to-digital converter (TDC) offering 82 ps resolution. A
home-programmed software analyzes the impinging sig-
nals for coincidences in order to extract the PDC click
statistics at a specific pump power, i.e., mean photon
number. Pump laser, TMD, and InGaAs-APD are syn-
chronized, triggered, and delay compensated in terms of
optical path differences by a delay generator running at
1 MHz repetition rate.
We analyze the photon-number-resolved click statistics
of our PDC process at pump powers that range over two
orders of magnitude. A high pump power forces the gen-
3FIG. 2. Experimental implementation of photon-number-
resolving PDC analysis (VAtt: variable attenuator; HWP:
half-wave plate; FC: fiber coupling; RG715: home-coated ab-
sorber; BPF: band pass filter; SMF: single-mode fiber; MMF:
multi-mode fiber; TMD: time-multiplexing detector; APD:
avalanche photodiode; TDC: time-to-digital-converter); see
text for details.
eration of higher-order photon states. The maximum ac-
cessible cw-equivalent pump power of 2µW corresponds
to a mean photon number of 〈n〉 = 0.84, and it is de-
termined by the saturation limit of our data acquisition
system. At each pump-power level we can set arbitrary
quantum channel transmission 0 < ηC ≤ 1 in the idler
arm, mimicking different transmission distances of a real-
world QKD system.
The Klyshko efficiencies [22] of our signal and idler arm
ηT and ηB are given by the ratio of coincidence counts
Ncoinc and the total number of single counts in the re-
spective opposite arm, NB and
∑
n≥1NT (n). In order to
correct the Klyshko efficiencies for uncorrelated events,
we estimate the number of accidentals beforehands as
Nacc =
NB ·
∑
n≥1NT(n)
NTrig
, (5)
where
∑
n≥1NT(n) is the accumulated number of de-
tection events in the TMD, NB denotes the number of
click events in the InGaAs-APD and NTrig is the num-
ber of trigger events within our measurement time. This
correction provides us with a lower bound for the actual
Klyshko efficiency, because higher-order photon contribu-
tions lead to an overestimation of the real values. We also
subtract coincidences Ndc,B and Ndc,T caused by dark
counts of the respective detector, and we finally find
ηT =
Ncoinc −Nacc −Ndc,T
NB
(6)
for the Klyshko efficiency in the signal/TMD arm and
ηB =
Ncoinc −Nacc −Ndc,B∑
n≥1NT (n)
(7)
for the Klyshko efficiency of the idler arm.
The results for different pump powers are shown in Ta-
ble I and indicate that our calculated Klyshko efficiencies
are only reliable at low pump powers, since we tend to
over-estimate accidentals - according to Eq. (5) - for in-
creasing pump powers and, thus, will artificially decrease
the Klysko efficiencies. In order to predict the behavior
of different n-photon states in the following, we base our
theoretical calculations on Klyshko efficiencies obtained
at the lowest available pump power. Note that this will
surely underestimate the influence of accidentals.
TABLE I. Overview of the power-dependent Klyshko efficien-
cies at maximum channel transmission
Pp [nW] 20 50 100 200 500 1000 2000
ηB[%] 10.75 10.72 10.65 10.02 9.97 9.41 8.55
ηT[%] 17.76 17.76 17.72 17.66 17.21 16.58 15.47
In order to ensure distinct detection probabilities for
different n-photon states after transmission through the
quantum channel, we analyze the click statistics and re-
construct the probabilities p (click|n) therefrom using Eq.
(4) and the inverse convolution matrix [19, 21, 23] of our
TMD. A typical measurement result at the highest ac-
cessible pump power of 2 µW and with ηC = 1 is shown
in Table II. We can clearly identify click events up to
photon numbers n = 4 within 60 s of measurement time,
which strongly indicates heralded four-photon states.
In Fig. 3 we plot p (click|n) versus the channel trans-
mission ηC, the latter of which represents an arbitrar-
ily long transmission device between the two QKD par-
ties. The distinct n-photon components clearly follow
different slopes and show also higher detection probabil-
ities for higher photon states. This verifies not only the
high brightness of our source, but it also agrees excel-
lently with the expected behavior. Our measurements
closely match the theoretical curves calculated with Eq.
(2), where we considered Poissonian distributions ρm as
well as convolution effects. We also assumed Klyshko
efficiencies of the low power regime, ηT = 0.1776 and
ηB = 0.1075, respectively. Note, that the differences to
the detection efficiencies ηSi and ηDet are caused by losses
introduced by the implemented optical components.
In a practical passive decoy-state QKD system, a PNS
attack will be detected by Alice and Bob, since the
click probability of one-photon contributions would be
increased artificially compared to the above statistics.
Thus, even if Eve was able to replace parts of the lossy
quantum channel by a perfect one for the attack, her
presence can be recognized. This is due to the fact, that
it is still undecided during transmission, which subset
of n-photon number states will be employed as decoys.
With our analysis scheme it is easy for Alice to antici-
pate, how the click statistics at Bob’s side should behave
at distinct pump powers. Thus, our PDC source fulfills
the necessary requirements for passive decoy-state QKD
in terms of predictable photon statistics and accessibility
to higher-order n-photon states in general. The seem-
ingly growing mismatch between experimental data and
theory curves for small n at large ηC can be explained
4TABLE II. Typical click-statistics at 2 µW pump power and with channel transmission ηC = 1.
zero-photon one-photon two-photon three-photon four-photon
N(′no click′|n) 49244089 6157356 334960 10383 197
N(click|n) 3049176 1092105 102653 4608 112
NT(n) 52293265 7249461 437613 14991 309
FIG. 3. Dependencies of the n-photon click probabilities on
the channel transmission at 2 µW cw-equivalent pump power;
dashed: theory curves.
by uncorrellated coincidences, which have an impact on
p (click|n). As stated above, by applying only Klyshko ef-
ficiencies from the low-power measurement to the theory,
we underestimate accidentals for higher pump powers.
The applicability of our source over a large range of dif-
ferent brightnesses, as needed for optimization of the pas-
sive decoy scheme, is shown by the behavior for different
mean photon numbers of the PDC states. In particular,
we calculated r (n) according to Eq. (3) from the indi-
vidual deconvoluted click probabilities at variable chan-
nel transmissions. The average ratios are plotted against
the mean photon number 〈n〉 in Fig. 4. We did not
register significant three- and four-photon components
at small mean photon numbers within acceptable mea-
surement durations. However, our measurement data ex-
hibit decreasing r (n) at higher pump powers according
to Poissonian statistics. This, on one hand, underlines
the photon-number-resolving capabilities of our TMD,
while on the other hand the very good agreement to the
theory proves that the n-photon PDC states in our spec-
trally broad source (FWHM(803 nm) ∼ 0.7 nm) show
almost pure Poissonian distributions. Remaining devi-
ations from theory can be explained by the finite num-
ber of spectral modes in our source, and again by the
impact of uncorrelated accidentals at higher mean pho-
ton numbers. The distinct detection probability ratios
for different n-photon states are key to accessing higher-
order photons as decoy states reliably. A PNS attack will
change the above characteristics in a way that the ratios
r (n) decrease artificially due to the increased amount
of one-photon contributions during classical PNS attacks
and, thus, can be detected. Therefore, Fig. 4 shows that
our source is usable at a broad range of pump powers.
FIG. 4. The click probability ratios r (n) follow Poissonian
distributions (dashed: theoretical predictions for ηT = 0.1776
and ηB = 0.1075).
In summary, we have shown the suitability of our in-
tegrated photon-pair source for practical passive decoy-
state QKD. We determined its photon-number-resolved
emission characteristics. Our results prove distinct de-
tection probabilities for different n-photon states up to
n = 4 at arbitrary quantum channel efficiencies. The
dependencies of the n-photon state click probability ra-
tios on increasing mean photon numbers closely follow
Poissonian distributions according to the spectral multi-
mode character of our PDC. Together with the capabil-
ity to reliably provide heralded four-photon states and
the excellent agreement to theoretical predictions, the
high brightness of our source fulfills the requirements for
passive decoy-state QKD. This constitutes an important
step towards real-world implementation of QKD schemes,
where all security loopholes have to be eliminated.
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